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The poetics of anti-Americanism in Greece: rhetoric, agency and local meaning 
 
Elisabeth Kirtsoglou & Dimitrios Theodossopoulos 
 
Abstract: In this article, we examine the content and rationale of anti-Americanism in 
Greece, drawing ethnographic information from two urban centres, Patras and Volos. 
We pay special attention to the conspiracy prone attributes of Greek anti-American 
rhetoric, and, instead of simply dismissing it, or seeing it primarily as a manifestation 
of nationalist thinking, we attempt to unpack the threads of meaning that make it so 
appealing in local contexts. We look in particular at the aetiology of blame within this 
particular discourse and try to explain the specific readings of history and politics that 
make it significant in local contexts. We argue that Greek anti-Americanism has an 
empowering potential for local actors, as it provides them with a certain degree of 
discursive agency over wider political processes that are beyond their immediate 
control.   
Keywords: Local rhetoric, perceptions of power, conspiracy, anti-Americanism, 
Greece. 
 
 
Introduction 
The citizens of Greece often engage in passionate debate about international politics 
and the role of the Great Powers in the greater scheme of events in history. In these 
conversations, the United States of America is the prime suspect for all kinds of 
injustice and malfunction in the world system: it is blamed for abusing its power, 
intervening unilaterally in the domestic affairs of other sovereign states, and also, for 
having harmed, among other small nations, Greece. Local actors in Greece have been 
noted for their skill in articulating arguments that blame the great powers as agents of 
disaster (Herzfeld 1982, 1992). They have been also noted for their skill in 
interpreting contemporary events in terms of familiar historical patterns (Sutton 1998) 
and for the analytical, pointed and irony-prone disposition of those interpretations 
(Brown & Theodossopoulos 2000, 2003; Kirtsoglou 2006). All these characteristics 
have been apparent in the Greek version of anti-American discourse, which, since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, has acquired an increasingly central stage in Greek local 
level conversations about the aetiology of political events. 
In this article we explore some of the most central themes of anti-Americanism in 
Greece and try to shed some light on its rhetorical complexity. Paul Hollander (2005), 
a major theorist of anti-Americanism perceives two distinct directions in anti-
American rhetoric. The first represents ‘a direct and rational response to the evident 
misdeeds of the United States abroad and its shortcomings and inequalities at home’, 
while the second emerges as ‘a largely groundless, irrational predisposition (similar to 
racism, sexism or anti-Semitism), an expression of deeply rooted scapegoating 
impulse, a disposition more closely related to the problems, frustrations, and 
deficiencies of those entertaining and articulating it’ (2005: 13, 15). We are unhappy 
with Hollander’s second view of anti-Americanism, which we feel does not do justice 
to the complexity and intricate meaningfulness of informal political commentary at 
the local level.  
Instead of treating anti-American discourse as a pathology, we prefer an approach that 
regards anti-Americanism as an ideology explaining ‘why the world is how it is’ and 
putting forward ‘a justification for future action’ (McPherson 2006: 1). We maintain 
that by acknowledging the exegetic potential of anti-Americanism we can better 
understand its appeal among disenfranchised local actors situated in the periphery of 
global power. Anti-Americanism may be laden with stereotypes, and often relies on 
deeply nationalist readings of history and political causality. The Greek variation, for 
example, evidently reproduces nationalist and irredentist claims (Stefanidis 2007). 
Yet, instead of dismissing this discourse hastily as primarily an expression of 
nationalist thinking, we prefer to examine its complexity, the historical events that 
inspire it, and its versatility as an explanatory tool.  
Anti-Americanist rhetoric, as in the case of conspiracy theory, is built upon culturally 
meaningful values and points of views, it has an underlying logic hidden within its 
apparent contradictions (Marcus 1999; Sanders & West 2003). We argue that anti-
American discourse has also an empowering dimension as it provides peripheral 
actors with a certain degree of discursive agency. The anti-American critique at the 
local level can provide disempowered local critics with the comfort of being able to 
discuss greater processes that lie beyond their direct control, and in many cases it can 
have an emancipatory ideological  potential.  
In this article we trace Greek renderings of anti-Americanism as these are discussed in 
informal contexts in two urban centres, Patras and Volos, the sites of our ongoing  
fieldwork investigating Greek political life.
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 In the sections that follow we first pay 
some close attention on how our respondents evaluate the United States and its 
citizens. Then, having described in detail the content and basic characteristics of local 
Greek perceptions of the US, we proceed to an analysis of the greater socio-political 
context that makes these views relevant. We also examine how our respondents 
discuss the local notions of ‘American’ ignorance and ‘American’ arrogance in their 
rhetorical arguments, and the tactics of blame attribution that emerge from the 
strategic deployment of these notions. Finally, we focus on the expectations of our 
respondents towards the US and the Western Great Powers, which remain unfulfilled, 
since our respondents believe that the West has not paid off its (perceived) historic 
debt to Greece. We argue that culturally meaningful ideas like these can help us fully 
appreciate the particular angle of Anti-Americanism in Greece and its appeal as a 
dynamic and popular discourse. 
 
Talking about ‘Americans’ and ‘America’ 
A fundamental distinction in our respondents discourse about the United States 
involves subtle distinctions about the government, its official agents, and its ordinary 
citizens. United States, the nation, is most frequently referred to in everyday 
conversation as ‘America’ (i Ameriki) and its official representatives, politicians, 
military and secret agents, as ‘the Americans’ (oi Amerikanoi). In fact in most 
conversations, the generalising category ‘Americans’ is at first instance reserved for 
the agents of the state, who are normally discussed as critically, and in as much an 
unenthusiastic manner, as the State itself. But a second kind of ‘Americans’ may 
potentially emerge in a conversation, one that refers to the ordinary citizens of the 
State, the everyday people. Here the evaluations of our respondents are more complex 
and nuanced, and can be potentially both negative and positive. Here are two 
examples: 
I have lived in America and I have seen their positive sides (ta kala tous)! 
They are smiling people, willing to be of service. Unlike me, my cousin who 
was a communist, hated them, until he spent some time in their country. He 
changed his opinion and now spends half the year in America. But he is still a 
communist. (A 53 year-old man, a lawyer) 
I do not like the arrogance of powerful states, but the Americans themselves 
are practical people, who try to better themselves. Some go after profit, but 
others serve the arts and the sciences. (A 45 year-old woman, a civil servant) 
In those cases that our respondents in Patras and Volos were prepared to comment 
about the ‘American’ people in less generalising terms, they stressed the 
heterogeneity of the US population, its multiethnic origin, and the recent history of 
that nation (which they contrasted with Greece’s presumed ethnic homogeneity and 
‘very long’ history).2 ‘They are a mosaic of civilisations’ (ena mosaiko politismon), 
our respondents underlined, ‘they have Christian fundamentalists and atheists’, ‘many 
uneducated people’—that is, ‘the crowd which is controlled (kateythinomeno) by the 
politicians’—and others who are ‘intellectuals and artists’. The latter can be 
‘intelligent’ (efyeis) and ‘pioneers’ (protoporoi) our respondents acknowledged, 
unlike the great majority of the population who are seen as ‘good-hearted’ 
(kalokardoi), but gullible or naive (afeleis). Even committed communists with strong 
anti-American views recognized, in the course of conversation, some humanising 
complexity among the rang of United State’s population: 
They have their good and bad sides (ta kala tous kai ta kaka tous). They do 
well in science, in art, in music; but their politicians are corrupted. Many 
people in America go daft over (apovlakonontai) from their own system, they 
do not know much about the dirty politics of their own government. 
Despite its condescending connotations, the stereotype of the ‘naïve American’, 
which emerged in several conversations in Patras and Volos, was often put into use to 
relieve the everyday citizens of United States from some of the blame usually 
reserved for the policies of their government. Our Greek respondents, experts in 
rationalising responsibility (Herzfeld 1993), sustain very subtle distinctions in the 
aetiology of blame, and can empathetically apply their own familiar blame-evading 
tactics in their evaluations of others. We must not lose perspective, however, of the 
patronising dimensions of this rhetorical strategy. A certain degree of occasional, 
political leniency towards the ordinary Americans—who are perceived as unaware of 
the political reality—represents a more widespread denigrating attitude. ‘They are 
‘clueless’ (adaeis), our respondents maintain, ‘they are slap-happy’ 
(xazoharoumenoi), ‘they live permanently in the darkness’ (zoun monima sto skotadi), 
having been brought up in such a way that ‘they don’t recognise what is happening 
(den xeroun ti pezetai) in the world’. 
In most comparisons of that kind the citizens of the world’s most powerful state are 
portrayed as unaware of the world itself, an evaluation that can inspire satirical 
comments and jokes that aim towards subverting political power, while at the same 
time encourage a favourable comparison with the powerless, but politically astute 
European-or-Mediterranean-or-Greek interlocutors of the given conversation. Seen 
from this point of view, the ‘Americans’ might be the citizens of a powerful nation, 
but they are, in many respects, and especially in terms of their political awareness, 
lesser than the peripheral actors of less-privileged nations. ‘Out of touch’ with and 
‘apathetic’ about what is happening in the world, they are easily ‘misled’ 
(paraplanounte) by their ‘unscrupulous’ (adistaktoi) politicians. For many modern 
Greeks, as Kirtsoglou (2006) has argued in her work on local views on terrorism, it is 
commonly assumed that the ordinary citizens of a given nation share some 
responsibility for the political choices of their government and, therefore it is 
considered fair if they are judged accordingly:  
I don’t have a fixed opinion about the Americans, but in the last years, my 
opinion has changed. It all depends on their actions in the world; the everyday 
Americans are good people, but their politics are threatening to the interests of 
Greece, and those of the smaller nations on earth. (A sixty-year old man, an 
accountant)  
The generalised ‘Americans’ in the discourse of our respondents are a fluid category 
of blame, and the degree of that blame is constantly re-evaluated in local 
conversation. In most cases, timely developments in the arena of international politics 
provide opportunities for sharp commentary, and inspire new arguments and 
comparisons, or used as evidence to validate previous conclusions. The division of 
Yugoslavia (Sutton 1998), the Western military intervention in the same country 
(Brown & Theodossopoulos 2000), the September 11 (Kirtsoglou 2006), as well as 
more recent interventions in Afganistan and Iraq (Kirtsoglou & Theodossopoulos 
n.d.) have all provided opportunities to assess the role of United States in international 
politics with respect to more contextual parameters, but also in generalising terms. 
We have observed three more encompassing and re-curing critical predispositions that 
transpire out of such conversations, and are used to criticize the people our 
respondents call ‘the Americans’. These involve (i) a perception of US arrogance 
(seen as emanating from US’s incontestable power), (ii) a critique of the interfering 
attitude of US in the local affairs of other nations, and (iii) a belief that US politics 
follow an anti-Greek orientation. These three critical directions merge and support 
each other in particular conversations, and provide inspiration for numerous 
derivative arguments. 
For example, and as several of our respondents volunteered to explain, the ‘big-
headedness’ of ‘the Americans’, encourages them to see other people as ‘second-rate’ 
(parakatianous), ‘as little ants that they can step on’. In other words, ‘the Americans’ 
believe that they are ‘superior’ and ‘treat others as third-world people’. This is a 
symptom of their ‘arrogance’ (eparsi), our respondents further explain, which ‘they’ 
subsequently demonstrate towards other, ‘smaller nations’ (stous mikroterous laous). 
According to this explanation, arrogance is the result of having and being able to 
exercise power, and the ‘Americans’, like other powerful nations before them, ‘have 
fallen in the trap of power’. 
‘The Americans have the power’, many respondents in Patras and Volos underlined, 
‘and they are putting it into use’ (tin hrisimopioun): they are intervening in other 
peoples’ lives’. The politics and moral justification of ‘intervention’ seriously 
concerned many of our interlocutors, who criticised the assumption that the 
‘Americans’ can be the ‘guardians’ (kidemones) of ‘other nations’ (allon laon) and 
exercise an authority to interfere for the sake of maintaining the peace. A 45 year-old 
woman, married and with four children, made clear this concern as follows:  
They think that they can be the rulers of the world. They are the rulers, of 
course, but the issue is that they take advantage of it, in a very deceitful 
manner (ypoulo tropo). For example, they talk about peace, but these are 
excuses to intervene.  
Some other informants clarified that the problem is not that the ‘Americans’ interfere, 
but that they get involved in ways that do not always seem properly justified. 
Fairness, partiality and impartiality in this context are assessed according to criteria 
that are meaningful to the local interlocutors that participate in a given discussion. So, 
while it is said that the ‘American injustices’ (oi adikies ton Amerikanon) are many, 
the examples that matter the most concern American intervention in Greek politics. 
Other cases of US intervention are often used as corroborating evidence for 
highlighting this greater feeling of ‘injustice’, which often has a more local reference. 
As we will further discuss in the following sections, US interference in Greece 
occurred mainly in the period following the Second World War, and our respondents 
are able to introduce particular examples in any given conversation, which often relate 
to events that they have experienced themselves. In their great majority, these 
‘American’ interferences are judged to be harmful to the interests and sovereignty of 
the Greek nation state. ‘They have taken advantage of us’, our respondents explained, 
‘history has shown how they act against us in a devious manner’. 
Some of our respondents treated those observations as indisputable, and felt no need 
to further rationalize their opinion: ‘the Americans are imperialists’, they argued in an 
emphatic manner, ‘American politics always harm Greece’. Some others, however, 
were ready to qualify their (otherwise) critical observations by offering more precise 
evaluations: ‘the Americans have done harm’, they stressed, ‘but’ this is true ‘in most 
cases’ or ‘in different degrees’. In some cases, they further clarified, ‘they’ have 
harmed the interests of Greece  ‘indirectly’, for example, ‘by helping the enemies of 
Greece’. 
To a certain degree, these small discrepancies in the accusatory tone of our 
respondents are influenced by political preferences and affiliations. Most of our 
respondents themselves will agree with the proposition that anti-Americanism in 
Greece has a history which is directly or indirectly associated with the political left. 
But they also acknowledge that nowadays anti-Americanism in Greece is more 
widespread than ever, with a popular appeal among supporters of all political parties. 
‘Anti-Americanism is not a left or right political choice, but a national one’, a 40 
year-old saleswoman explained, while a 35 year-old man, a computer technician, 
added, in a similar, but slightly more rhetorical tone, ‘Anti-Americanism in Greece is 
not a left or right direction; it is a human reaction… Everybody can see the game of 
the Americans’.  
Seen from this point of view, a critical predisposition towards the United States and 
its politics is not directly, and not always, related to party politics and commitment to 
already circumscribed ideological predilections. Some of our most dispassionate and 
cool-headed respondents describe anti-Americanism as ‘the latest fashion’, or a 
rhetoric that the non-leftists have borrowed from the leftists, appropriating its populist 
potential. A few respondents, and among them some of a leftist persuasion, attributed 
extreme anti-Americanism to the extreme right, an attitude which they compared to 
the more systematically articulated anti-Americanism of the left; ‘the extreme right is 
far worst’ they explained, that is, ‘they are even more anti-American’, and ‘for the 
wrong reasons’.  
Finally, reflecting upon the degree and magnitude of the growing anti-American 
attitudes in Greece, our respondents in Patras and Volos made their own self-
evaluation. Greece is definitely an anti-American nation they admitted, but the Greeks 
are not necessarily more anti-American than many other people (apo tous allous 
laous). Maybe they are, we were told, more critical towards the ‘Americans’ than 
other Europeans, but there are ‘other nations that hate the Americans more than the 
Greeks’, while we should not forget, as two or three informants suggested, ‘that there 
are many Greeks who live in America’.  
‘I think we are more normal anti-Americanists than other anti-Americanists’, said a 
25 year-old music instructor, reflecting upon what for him is a familiar and culturally 
meaningful type of anti-Americanism. We will present some of its historically 
constituted rational in the section that follows. For now we conclude with the words 
of a 50 year-old primary school teacher, a woman with of a progressive, but not 
explicitly leftist political orientation: 
the Greeks critisise the  Americans all the time, but most imitate the American 
way of life, in many respects, and without discretion (diakrisi); they pretend to 
be anti-American to show of, to appear cultured and different (gia figura, gia 
koultoura, gia diaforetitikotita), but all this is pretentious (ola auta omos einai 
dithen). 
 
The West and its debt 
Anti-Americanism—or the existence of anti-American discourses—is certainly not an 
exclusively Greek phenomenon. The political legacy of the cold war and recent 
developments related to the ‘war on terrorism’ have led people from all around the 
world to question the sincerity of US policies (cf. Kirtsoglou 2006; Kirtsoglou nd.; 
Marcus 1999). In an attempt to explain anti-Americanism, Said argues that such a 
political stance is the result of ‘a series of historical interventions and inhuman 
policies coldly exercised by the US’ (2001: 45), while Spiro refers to various types of 
anti-Americanism found in Europe in order to conclude that Anti-Americanism 
consists not of opposition to particular policies but of ‘persistent patterns of gross 
criticism of the main values of the U.S. Constitution’ (1988: 497). The question of 
whether or not Greek anti-Americanism is political (originating from opposition to 
specific policies) rather than cultural (inspired by an opposition to North American 
cultural values in general), as Veremis (2003) would argue, has not, we feel, a clear-
cut answer. The historical contextualisation of Greek anti-US feelings supports both 
possibilities. This is why it will be necessary to examine carefully both the history of 
the relations between Greece and the Western Powers and the history of Greece itself 
(in socio-cultural terms) in order to do justice to the spectrum of the various and 
sometimes conflicting views of our informants.   
As we have already mentioned, in the period following the Second World War anti-
Western attitudes in Greece were rather limited to the political Left (see also 
Stefanidis 2007: 169). The bitter civil war that broke in the country in 1945 ended in 
favour of the government forces, which were crucially empowered by British and 
American aid (Clogg 1992: 141-142). The British forces led by general Skoby 
suspended the communist military control of Athens in 1944, and the US (following 
the 1947 Truman Doctrine) consistently prevented Greece from falling under the 
Soviet influence (cf. Stefanidis 2007: 169). The Marshall plan evoked of course the 
sympathy of the Greek people who—despite the fact that the Left was no insignificant 
part of the Greek society—had ultimately committed themselves to the West (cf. 
Clogg 1992: 179, 181; Argyrou 2002: 100-1; Kirtsoglou 2006).
3
   
One dimension of explaining the catholic Greek anti-americanism of today is thus 
related to an account of how the deep-seated belief that ‘Greece belongs to the West’ 
gave gradually its place to the conviction that Greece is an homage of the Western 
powers. The strategic position of Greece in the cold war years constituted foreign 
intervention, ‘not an exception but a consistent pattern in Greece’s relationship with 
the West’ (Sutton 2003: 197; cf. Nachami 1990; Samatas 1986: 15; Papadopoulos 
1989: 49; Clogg 1992: 146-171). The American aid in the fifties was accompanied by 
a certain degree of political control that in the consciousness of the general public 
culminated in the alleged support offered by the US government and the NATO allies 
to the military Junta, which established itself in Greece in April 1967. A careful 
historical appreciation of US-Greek relations from the 50s onwards reveals however 
that while in certain occasions US interference can be documented, in some others it 
cannot (cf. Glogg 1992: 147, 155). The US government (led by president Kissinger) 
did nothing more than non-condemning the Greek military regime of 1967-1974, 
while, as Stefanidis (2007) pointedly observes from 1953 onwards, Greek political 
forces were often inviting themselves foreign intervention. 
Stefanidis (2007) is certainly right to claim that American omnipotence is a myth. The 
US is certainly not the puppeteer of all Greek political developments post 1945. The 
image of American all-powerfulness ‘despite the fact that it contains elements of 
truth, more often than not it operates in an oversimplifying manner as an alibi for 
actions and omissions of political agents inside Greece’ (Stefanidis 20061). Anti-
Americanism in Greece has been consistently put into use and reinforced by parties 
and individuals for reasons of political convenience (cf. Kirtsoglou 2006). It could be 
argued—and we will return to this claim later on—that discourses which blame the 
US for almost all ailments of Greek contemporary history can be partly explained as 
‘narratives of opposition’ (cf. Stewart and Strathern 2002) that detract attention from 
all kinds of internal failures and weaknesses (Clogg 1992, Herzfeld 1993). Greek 
politicians across the political spectrum have systematically transferred their own 
responsibilities and failures onto dark external forces, while simultaneously took 
advantage of international crises to create internal polarisation and safeguard their 
political survival (see Clogg 1992: 182; Kirtsoglou 2006: 70). 
At the same time, it is also important to acknowledge that in the cold-war period, the 
US benefited from political developments in Greece, including the military regime of 
the 1967-1974 (see Stefanidis 2007: 176) and clearly prioritised political control over 
concerns about democracy, civil rights, transparency and equality. Greek attitudes 
towards the US and the Western Powers in general can therefore be adequately, and 
without much predilection, be seen as having been moulded by the wider political 
environment of the cold war era, which has undeniably shaped contemporary Greek 
historical consciousness (cf. Herzfeld 1992). ‘America’—as our informants like to 
call the US—has been indeed the hegemonic power that up to a degree steered local 
and international history (cf. Clogg, 1992: 150-171; Sutton 2003: 201; Brown & 
Theodossopoulos 2003: 321-322) and kept reminding Greece, often in painful ways, 
of its ‘relative lack of power and the realities of colonial and post-colonial world 
politics’ (Sutton 2003: 197). 
Considering that in the period after the Second World War anti- or pro- Americanism 
was mostly a matter of left or right wing affiliation respectively, it is worth turning 
our attention to what is seen by both scholars and local level actors as the turning 
point for the relations between Greece and the US: the failure of the US and the 
Western Powers in general to support Greece and Cyprus since 1954. In order to 
concisely account for the events between 1954 and 1974 in an analytically rich 
manner, we will explore and follow at first instance Stefanidis’s compelling argument 
that Greek anti-Americanism relates in fact to irredentism and nationalism. Without 
totally rejecting this claim however, we will subsequently try to enrich the analysis by 
maintaining that nationalism and irredentism need themselves to be explained and 
contextualised before they can compose sufficient explanations for other attitudes.  
Bringing ample evidence into his analysis, Stefanidis manages to show that the US 
attitude towards Greek politics in general and the demand of unification with Cyprus 
in particular, ‘collided with the irredentist core of Greek political culture’, thus 
engendering ‘a surge of Anti-Americanism that proved nearly impossible to quell’ 
(2007: 190). Indeed the US refusal to support the unification of Cyprus with Greece, 
and later to prevent, or reverse the effects of Turkish military intervention on that 
island alienated to a great extent the Greek public and obliterated dividing lines 
                                               
1
 Extract of an interview in the Greek newspaper ‘ta Nea’ (our translation) 
between right and left. Stefanidis is providing us with one of the most eloquent 
instances of expression of the Greek feelings at the time by Psathas, a regular 
columnist in the newspaper ‘ta Nea’. Reflecting upon the tension of the 1964 period 
and the bombarding of the area of Tilliria in Cyprus by Turkish planes Psathas 
comments that “the soul of every Greek revolted… inside this iron ring of hostility 
and cynicism where Greece found herself ensnared by her ‘great allies’ (Stefanidis 
2007: 233). Psathas regrets the fact that Greece has ever subscribed in the ‘deceitful 
principles of NATO’ and comments: ‘the attack had come not from the north,4 but 
from the barbarians from the East who harbour an age old hatred against us’ (ibid.). 
The perception of the Greek and the Greek Cypriot side of what was right and 
justified was indeed guided by irredentist considerations and a firmly established 
belief that the West owes to Greece (and Cyprus as part of the Greek culture), not 
only a ‘repayment’ for its allegiance during the two World Wars, but also—and 
perhaps more importantly—the very existence of Western culture, practically and 
symbolically. Symbolically, because classical Greece is seen according to this line 
of thinking as the ‘cradle of Western civilisation’ (likno tou Dytikou politismou), and 
practically because the Greeks perceive themselves as having always played the role 
of the levee against the ‘barbarians’ who came at various points in time from the 
East.
5
 In turn, in Greek consciousness Western betrayal is also a recurrent 
phenomenon since the time of the crusades and the capture of Constantinople by the 
crusaders in 1204.  
Considering the above, Stefanidis (2007) is right in his reading of Greek anti-
Americanism as a phenomenon that originates in irredentism and in nationalism. 
Yet, we have good reason to point towards some additional complexity: present-day 
history is read by the Greek public in terms of past history; it is dynamically 
interpreted and re-interpreted in a never-ending interplay of narratives that feed on 
each other and solidify identities, attitudes, feelings and processes of political 
causality (see Sutton 1998).
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 For this reason it is important to examine carefully the 
context and content of nationalism as well as other possible sources of inspiration of 
anti-American discourses. In the section that follows, we will attempt a re-
consideration of Greek anti-Americanism in terms of a search for local meaning and 
what we call an expectation for ‘political consistency’. 
 
When the West does not keep its side of the bargain 
In an article that explores anti-Americanism in Turkey Bilge Criss explains how the 
US stance on the Cyprus issue has alienated the Turkish public, posing questions of 
allegiance to NATO and raising issues concerning national Turkish sovereignty 
(2002: 475). For the puzzled unsuspecting reader—who might expect that if Greece is 
dissatisfied with the US stance in a Greco-Turkish dispute, then Turkey should be 
satisfied—we need to explain why these two different countries had the same 
expectation: namely, that the US had (and ought to have) the role of the defender of 
international justice. Stefanidis explains this as being partly related to local (Greek) 
opinion makers and partly to the American rhetoric and propaganda (2007: 190). The 
introduction of Turkey adds of course an awkward complication to the first part of 
this argument. If it is Greek opinion makers who are responsible for the perception of 
the US as an international ‘trustee’ of peace, democracy and political justice then we 
need to assume that Turkish opinion makers followed a similar strategy and of course 
we then need to explain the similarity.  
At this point it is easier I think if we rely more on Stefanidis’s second reason, namely 
the American rhetoric itself. Considering the US role in international politics during 
the cold war and after, we believe that we can safely point to the presence of an 
hegemonic global empire that exports and imposes ideologies and policies alike in 
various parts of the world (Stewart Harawira 2005; Kirtsoglou n.d.). It is not just the 
local actor’s perception that the US is the regulator (up to a certain extent) of 
international developments. The US presents itself as such, claims this role for itself, 
and has acted upon it, often entirely unilaterally and on more than one occasion.   
Undeniably local politicians transfer responsibilities to ‘external’ forces. Andreas 
Papandreou, one of the greatest political figures in post-second world war Greece and 
prime minister of the country for nearly 20 years has used anti-Americanism in a 
rather populist and reactionary manner and as a panacea for nearly every internal 
problem in Greece (cf. Veremis 2003). Papandreou was among the first people
7
 who 
publicly spoke of Greece as a satellite country to the Western powers and compared 
the relations between Greece and the US to those of Czechoslovakia and the USSR 
(Couloumbis 1974). Papandreou’s anti-Americanist discourse marked more than one 
generation of Greek citizens, and cultivated an idiosyncratic type of Greek 
nationalism that is nowadays defended even by those who twenty years ago were his 
political rivals. It capitalised upon the populist notion that ‘Greece belongs to the 
Greeks’, a slogan that encapsulated popular dissatisfaction with NATO, the EU, the 
US and the Western Powers in general, in a country, which—paradoxically—was at 
the same time fighting hard to achieve accession in the EU, to gain US favouritism, 
and to acquire a strong role in NATO. 
Greece committed itself to the West (partly by writing off a substantial part of its 
Leftist population who was exiled or lived as outlaws until 1974) in the hope that she 
would be an equal signatory in a group of nations that shared the same principles of 
democracy, fairness, transparency and national sovereignty. The Greek dissatisfaction 
with the US today stems, up to a great extent, from the realization that this hope might 
have just been wishful thinking. Given that the entire cold war politic was about an 
ultimate, collective and historical task that led the US and the Western Powers in 
General to systematically prioritise political ends over means, such feelings of 
dissatisfaction do not seem entirely unreasonable. The history of Greek-American 
relations, the history US’s relations with other countries, and the realpolitik since the 
Second World War in general, seriously question how self-evident the principles of 
the ‘Western civilisation’ (broadly speaking) are nowadays. In this context the Greek 
people feel certainly frustrated—to say the least—by the attitude of their ‘traditional 
allies’ who are regarded as having committed a kind of treason by not keeping their 
end of the bargain.  
‘In all its modern history’, many of our respondents emphatically state, ‘Greece has 
fought side by side with the Western Powers, but we have never gained anything in 
return’. The lack of support (or, what is seen as lack of support) to Greece in relation 
to Turkey, in the events in Cyprus, or in the more recent dispute about the naming of 
Macedonia, pose to our respondents a problem of political consistency. The US 
intervenes in Yugoslavia in favour of the Kossovars, but leaves Turkey untouched 
when it comes to the Kurds. US’s traditional ally (Greece) is not supported adequately 
in the case of Cyprus. Turkey that did not fight on the side of the English and the 
Americans in the Second World War is perceived as having gained more than Greece 
in the post-Second World War history. The US recognises the use of the name of 
‘Macedonia’ by a neighbouring state showing disrespect not only to what is seen by 
the overwhelming majority of Greeks as a part of an indisputable Greek history, but 
also, and more importantly, to the very cultural heritage of the West as a whole which 
is heavily based on the ideals of classical Greece.  
Greek anti-Americanism and discontent with the Western Powers in general, cannot 
therefore be adequately explained outside indigenous perceptions of history and what 
constitutes, in the eyes of our respondents, political and historical consistency. In the 
section that follows, we conclude this article by demonstrating that anti-Americanism 
in Greece relates to historical expectations of what constitutes alliance and allegiance 
and ultimately, to the very need of the social actor to exercise political agency in a 
world that is governed by entities far greater and far more powerful than the Self.  
 
Ignorance, Arrogance and Allegiance  
A widely recognisable slang term for ‘naïve’ in colloquial Greek is ‘amerikanaki’ 
(diminutive of ‘American’). Our informants often boast that they are not 
‘amerikanakia’ (plural), they were not born yesterday, and they cannot be easily 
fooled ‘like the American people’. The latter are in turn constructed in the local 
imagination as a nation living not merely in ignorance, but in a kind of staged reality 
manufactured by the media (like CNN) and sustained by American politicians who 
are mostly puppets of big corporations (or capitalism in general) and of the CIA. As 
we explained in the previous sections, the distinction between ‘America’ (as a nation) 
and ‘the Americans’ (as individual people) suggests some empathy towards everyday 
people imagined as the Self. This kind of empathy extends even to the people of 
powerful nations and is itself a kind of exegetical tool that serves to partly justify why 
the realpolitik proves to be so different from indigenous perceptions of justice. 
Imagining the Other as powerless (through ignorance this time) provides some 
justification for what our respondents see as lack of resistance to power, or failure to 
engage with injustice in world politics. 
In everyday conversation, the above view is usually put forward with examples. A 
popular one refers to the strikes on Yugoslavia in 1999, which according to the 
prevailing sense of justice of many in Greece should have never happened (see Brown 
& Theodossopoulos 2000, 2003). Nevertheless it did and the American public were 
not able to resist, since, our respondents argue, the ‘Americans’ were misled by 
politicians and the media on the particulars of the situation. The introduction here of 
an argument that highlights the ‘false political consciousness’ of the public in United 
States—apart from humanizing so to speak the target audience—also provides a 
means of never adequately questioning the Self’s perceptions of justice, historical 
causality and political fairness. According to this logic, if the Others do not act in a 
manner that appears to agree with the Self, this is not because every coin might have 
two sides, but because the Others simple don’t know the truth. Conspiracy scenarios 
do not then involve only Greece and the smaller nations. They can apply equally well 
to the US and its people thus accounting for all kinds of paradoxes and providing 
meaning, coherence and continuity in local discourse.  
The existence of dark capitalist centres and the power of agencies like the CIA, is in 
turn a fine example of analogical thinking. An important feature of the Greek post-
Second World War political scene was the existence of the parakratos, the semi-legal 
state apparatus, or the para-governmental network, or ‘parastate’ as Clogg (1992: 157) 
translates it (cf. Kirtsoglou 2006: 69). The parakratos has been associated with the 
most conservative forces within Greece and it was considered responsible for a 
number of events that eventually lead to the establishment of the 1967 dictatorship in 
Greece. Familiar historical patterns inspire Greek understanding of unfamiliar settings 
(Sutton 1998) and thus the CIA is imagined very much as the equivalent parakratos in 
the US that stirs American political life, exercising overt or covert control of local 
politicians.  
In terms of the discourse described so far, ignorance is a strong exegetical tool. 
However, it is not always easily applicable, and it does not always relieve US citizens 
from their share of blame entirely. After all—in spite of their ignorance—they 
represent what is seen as the earth’s most powerful nation. The ‘Americans’ are 
therefore portrayed sometimes as being en masse responsible for the misdeeds of the 
nation. The idea of ‘collective responsibility’ (and in particular collective political 
responsibility) is tied to the concept of the nation as an imagined community engaged 
in ‘steady, anonymous and simultaneous activity’ (Anderson 1983: 31). The nation—
very much conceptualised in terms of kinship (Sutton 1998)—is deemed collectively 
accountable for the actions of its representatives.
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 In this respect, the US people share 
the arrogance of their leaders.  
US arrogance is demonstrated (according to our respondents in Greece) through acts 
of intervention in the affairs of other smaller nations, unilateralism and systematic 
attempts towards polarisation of the international political community. While other 
nations in the world, such as Greece, have committed themselves to the West 
genuinely believing in the superiority of democracy and equality as ideals of political 
organisation, the US behaves as if it were an Empire.  The resulting World Order is in 
effect, as our informants emphatically state alluding to the Roman Empire, a ‘Pax 
Americana’. Whereas consensus is the ultimate criterion of legitimacy in modern 
Western societies (Scrutton 2002: 8), US political unilateralism and flamboyant 
exhibition of power make many Greek local actors feel that the social contract as a 
principle of Western post-enlightenment organisation is being constantly violated 
(Kirtsoglou 2006: 79).  
Attempts to divide the world between ‘us’ and ‘them’, the differential standards 
employed in political decisions, and concepts such as that of international security and 
terrorism, are all seen by our informants as mere excuses that cast some nations 
‘outside the protection of the rules of justice’ (Frey and Morris 1991: 9-10). 
Traditional allies of the Western Powers—like Greece—thus find themselves in the 
middle of critical political games where they have to formally support actions (like 
the war in Iraq) with which they otherwise disagree. The ideals of democracy, justice 
and the equality of the nations are then regarded as having been practically abandoned 
while Greece and other, less powerful allies of the US, are perceived as having been 
transformed from allies to satellite states in the imperium of the New World Order.  
Apart from the violation of significant Western ideals of political organisation like 
consensus and equality, the local perception of US arrogance relates to the denigration 
of another important concept, that of allegiance. It does so in a rather complex 
manner. The Greeks have always imagined themselves as allies of the Western 
Powers and not satellites of Western Power. As many anthropologists have 
persuasively explained the Greek people collectively feel that classical Greek culture 
has been the cradle of Western civilisation (see among others, Herzfeld 1987). The 
Western World is seen therefore as a natural ally to Greece, because Greece, in the 
political consciousness of the indigenous actors, represents its very cultural heritage. 
Despite the undisputable fact, however, that Greek politics are allied to the West, 
many local actors in Greece do not feel equal members of the Western Powers. As 
Herzfeld has noted, they “seriously and frequently ask themselves if perhaps they now 
belong politically, economically and culturally to the Third World (1987: 3).  
This is seen on behalf of the Greeks as another type of treason. Even if there is no 
equality in the world, even if the principles of Western political organisation proved 
to be a kind of ‘foundation myth’ (cf. Gellner 1995: 62), the Western Powers ought to 
treat the Greeks as their respectful ally in recognition of their cultural heritage and of 
what they had offered to the world. Therefore, even if we ultimately accept that we all 
live in an unjust world, many local Greek actors feel that Greece should not have to 
suffer the consequences of injustice because of its past, its adamant commitment to 
the West and the sacrifices the country has made in its modern history. It is in the 
context of the latter that Stefanidis’s argument can be constructively expanded. Greek 
nationalism and irredentism does inform the expectations of the Greek public, and the 
Greek version of anti-Americanism definitely relates to the fact that the US has not 
supported sufficiently Greek irredentist claims. However, what can help us fully 
appreciate Greek anti-American discourse is the expectation of many in Greece that 
US ought to have supported the Greek claims, and it has not. 
 
Conclusion: Anti-Americanism as a context for political agency 
The ignorance of the US citizens, the arrogance of US as a nation state, the betrayed 
allegiance of a more powerful ally, are all important dimensions of Greek anti-
American discourse. Precisely because of its resonance to locally accepted versions of 
history, and the related perceptions of historical and political causality, anti-
Americanism is definitely an empowering discourse. It is empowering to those who 
use it, because of its populist appeal, but also because of its potential for exercising a 
certain degree of discursive agency. When local-level actors weave anti-American 
arguments, however conspiratorial or nationalist these might sound, they demonstrate 
their capacity to (at least) understand the truth, even when they cannot influence 
matters. They might be the ‘pariahs of the New World Order’, but through the pointed 
character of their anti-American critique, they demonstrate (at least) that they are not 
naïve, a-political, ‘young-Americans’ (Amerikanakia). 
Our respondents in Greece acknowledge that they might not have real political power, 
but they strongly believe that they can understand how political power works. The 
power of understanding—the power of knowledge, as Foucault (1980) would have 
called it—compensates for the lack of ‘real’, ‘hands on’ power to influence political 
developments. It is from this circuitous, but easily realised  position of argumentative 
authority that local actors in peripheral contexts elicit their anti-American rhetoric. 
Anti-Americanism in Greece, undeniably, and as Stefanidis (2007) has claimed, 
closely relates and reproduces Greek nationalist and irredentist claims. We have 
demonstrated in this article that it also has something important to reveal about the 
search for meaning and consistency in political life, the desire of peripheral actors to 
exercise some form of agency over the greater political processes that surround them. 
From the local point of view this agency is comforting, and to a significant degree 
empowering, even if its power and appeal is only discursive.  
The modern Greek State is itself in many respects the by-product of a certain, specific 
historical development, and of the desire of the 19
th
 century Great Powers for this 
state to exist. Its history and identity—based in the belief in an unbreakable continuity 
of classical and modern Greece—are themselves ideas cultivated first and foremost by 
European romanticism. In some respects Greece was led to believe that it belongs to 
the West and that it is the natural ally of the Western, Christian Great Powers. It is 
precisely this inconsistency that most of our informants struggle to apprehend. The 
West has always desired Greece to be its part, always acknowledged its affinity with 
the Greek past, but at the same time, has consistently denied Greece its equal political 
status, and an equal share in the privilege position of determining the world affairs. 
In the context of the Greek anti-Americanist discourse, the inconsistency we have 
describe above is sometimes explained away through partially empathetic arguments 
which highlight the ‘ignorance’ and the misguided nature of the US political 
consciousness; other times through conspiracy-prone scenarios that blame capitalist 
forces or secret agencies; and some other times, it is discussed in terms of the Western 
Powers’ arrogance and their failure to uphold the principles of post-Enlightenment 
political organization. Yet a few times ‘treason’ and disappointment is perceived 
beyond the ideological level. The US and Europe have not just betrayed the ideals of 
the social contract, of transparency, equality and consensus. They went as far as 
betraying their own political and ideological allies, and ultimately, their own very 
culture that originates from the same classical ideals. Anti-Americanism, in this 
respect, can be seen as a quest for meaning and consistency, as well as a context for 
engendering political agency. For, in a world without meaning and consistency the 
only power left to the local actor is that of understanding. 
 
Notes
                                               
1
 See, Theodossopoulos & Brown (2000, 2003); Theodossopoulos (2004, 2007b); Kirtsoglou (2007); 
Kirtsoglou & Theodossopoulos (n.d.).   
2
 The United States of America has a longer history as an independent nation state (founded in 1786) 
than Greece (1829), but for most Greeks the history of their nation starts in antiquity and it is 
considered to have followed an uninterrupted and continuous course since then. See, Herzfeld (1986), 
Just (1989), Stewart (1991), Theodossopoulos (2007a).  
3
 The post second World War legacy is still a dimension of lay analysis of Greek Anti-Americanism. 
Despite the fact that –as we will show- there is no such right-left wing distinction anymore, in the 
consciousness of many people –especially older informants- anti-Americanism is often portrayed as a 
predominantly Leftist discourse.   
4
 Although Stefanidis who provides us with this excellent quotation does not clarify what Psathas 
means by ‘north’, we can safely assume that the columnist is referring here to the northern borders of 
Greece (Bulgaria and Yugoslavia at the time), that were part of the Soviet block, from which NATO 
was supposed to protect the country.  
5
 See Stefanidis 110-123. Of course this line of thought is itself established in the belief that there is a 
continuous and unbreakable historical line between Classical and Modern Greece through the 
Byzantine Empire. For more about this particular thought see the work of several anthropologists, see 
Herzfeld (1987, 1997); Just (1989); Stewart (19940; Faubion (1993); Karakasidou (1997); Sutton 
(1998); Hirschon (2000); Yalouri (2001); Brown & Hamilakis (2003); Theodossopulos (2007).  
6
 The importance of the past for the present and vice versa is not of course peculiar to the Greeks. Since 
we have referred to what the Greeks believe about the American role in the stay of the Greek Junta in 
power for seven years, we can also refer to Bill Clinton’s apology to the Greek public during his 2004 
visit for US’s attitude towards the military regime. 1204 is similarly not a ghost that exists in Greek 
minds only. During the first ever meeting of the Roman Pope with a representative of the Greek church 
since the schism, Pope John-Paul the second apologized to the then archbishop of Greece 
Christodoulos “for all the occasions when the children of Catholic Church have sinned against their 
Orthodox brothers”. The apology alluded directly to the crusades.  
7
 The supporters of the communist party were also expressing similar opinions of course, but KKE (the 
Greek communist party) was not legal until 1974 and thus Papandreou’s statement was of particular 
value since it was coming from an ‘official’ politician and not just the representative of a discriminated 
and outlawed party.  
8
 This is of course not some pre-modern and archaic element, but an idea consistently cultivated in the 
context of the modern nation-state. For more on this issue, see Kirtsoglou (2006: 71-2).  
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